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William A. Callahan*, ‘History, Tradition and the China Dream:  Socialist 
Modernization in the World of Great Harmony’ Journal of Contemporary 
China, 24:96 (2015): 983-1001, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1030915 
 
How will China influence world politics in the twenty-first century? Many people 
answer this question by looking to Chinese history, and particularly to traditional 
models of Chinese World Order. This essay seeks to complicate this question by 
asking which history, and which tradition? While it is common to look at China’s pre-
modern history as “tradition,” this essay argues that we also need to appreciate how 
“socialism” is treated as a tradition alongside Chinese civilization. It does this by 
examining how China’s public intellectuals appeal to two seemingly odd sources: 
Mao Zedong’s 1956 speech “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party 
Traditions,” and the “Great Harmony” passage from the two millennia-old Book of 
Rites. It will argue that these two passages are employed as a way of salvaging 
socialism; the ideological transition thus is not from communism to nationalism, but 
to a curious combination of socialism and Chinese civilization. This new 
socialist/civilization dynamic integrates equality and hierarchy into a new form of 
statism, which is involved in a global competition of social models. Or to put it 
another way, what these two passages have in common is not necessarily a positive 
ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the West and the United States. 
 
Introduction 
 
Where is China going? How will it influence world politics in the twenty-first century? 
As this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary China shows, such questions 
currently vex commentators not only in the West, but within the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) as well.  
Passages from New Left political scientist Pan Wei and the liberal authors 
(including Nobel-laureate Liu Xiaobo) of “Charter 08” show how China’s future 
direction is a shared concern. Charter 08 asks: “Where is China headed in the 
twenty-first century? Will it continue with ‘modernization’ under authoritarian rule, or 
will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and 
build a democratic system?”1 In his introduction to The China Model, Pan likewise 
feels that China is at a “crossroads.” But he suggests a different approach: “In the 
next 30 years; what direction will the Chinese nation take? Will it preserve China’s 
																																																								*		William A. Callahan is professor of international relations, London School of 
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1 Liu Xiaobo, et al., “Charter 08,” in No Enemies, No Hatred: Selected Essays and 
Poems, ed. Perry Link, Tianchi Martin-Liao and Liu Xia, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), p. 301. 
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rejuvenation? Or will it have superstitious faith in the Western ‘liberal democracy’ 
system, and go down the road of decline and enslavement?”2  
In Xi Jinping’s first month as China’s leader in 2012, he addressed this concern 
when he proposed the “China Dream” (中国梦) as his vision of the PRC’s future 
direction. Xi’s “China dream” is for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” 
which, as he later explained, means “achieving a rich and powerful country, the 
revitalization of the nation, and the people’s happiness.”3  
This discussion of directions and dreams is actually part of a broad and ongoing 
debate about the “moral crisis” that China faces after three decades of economic 
reform and opening up. In other words, China’s New Left, military intellectuals, 
traditionalists and liberals all worry about the “values crisis” presented by what they 
call China’s new “money-worship” society.4 Intellectuals from across the political 
spectrum thus are engaged in what Chinese call “patriotic worrying” (忧患意识); they 
feel that it is their job to ponder the fate of the nation, and to find the “correct formula” 
to solve China’s problems.5 
Curiously, in this broad discussion, two quotations keep appearing, which offer quite 
distinct “correct formulas” for saving China. Many appeal to a quotation from Mao 
Zedong’s “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions” (1956) 
speech to frame China’s direction and objectives in the twenty-first century:  
 
“Given fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake the United 
States. This is an obligation. … [I]f after working at it for fifty or sixty 
years you are still unable to overtake the United States, what a 
sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of the 
earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, 
but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, the Chinese 
nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not 
be making much of a contribution to humanity.”6 																																																								
2 Pan Wei, “Dangdai Zhonghua tizhi: Zhongguo moshi de jingji, zhengzhi, shehui 
jiexi,” in Pan Wei, ed., Zhongguo moshi jiedu renmin gongheguo de 60 nian (Beijing: 
Zhongyang bianshi chubanshe, 2009), p. 82.  
3 Xi Jinping in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Xi Jinping guanyu 
shixian Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de Zhongguo meng: Lunshu gaobian [Xi 
Jinping on realizing the China dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: 
Discussion edition], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, December 2013), pp. 
3, 5. Hereafter the book will be cited as Xi Jinping guanyu Zhongguo meng. 
4 See Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de daguo siwei zhanlue 
dingwei [The China dream: The great power thinking and strategic positioning of 
China in the post-American era], (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2010); Xu 
Jilin, Dangdai Zhongguo de qimeng yu fan-qimeng [Enlightenment and anti-
enlightenment in contemporary China], (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 
2011); Pan, Zhongguo moshi; William A. Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the 
Future, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); William A. Callahan, “Citizen Ai: 
Warrior, Jester and Middleman,” Journal of Asian Studies, 73(4), (2014): 899-920. 
5 Gloria Davies, Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Liu, Zhongguo meng. 
6 Mao Zedong, “Zengqiang dang de tuanjie, jicheng dang de chuantong” 
[Strengthening Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions], (August 30, 
1956), Speech at the first session of the preparatory meeting for the Eighth 
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Many also appeal to the two millennia-old utopian ideal of Great Harmony (大同) 
from the Book of Rites (礼记):  
 
“When the Great Way prevails, the world will belong to all. They chose 
people of talent and ability whose words were sincere, and they cultivated 
harmony. Thus people did not only love their own parents, not only 
nurture their own children. … In this way selfish schemes did not arise. 
Robbers, thieves, rebels, and traitors had no place, and thus outer doors 
were not closed. This is called the Great Harmony.”7 
 
References to these two rather different passages—that propose quite different 
“correct formulas” that lead to distinct directions, goals and ideals—have become 
common in works by citizen intellectuals, especially New Left intellectuals like Hu 
Angang, Liu Mingfu, Pan Wei, and Zhao Tingyang as well as establishment 
intellectuals like Zheng Bijian and Zhang Weiwei. 
This essay will examine how New Left and establishment intellectuals have 
addressed China’s “moral crisis” with an appeal to tradition. As these two quotations 
show, “tradition” here refers not simply to China’s pre-modern civilization, but also to 
China’s modern revolutionary and reformist ideology. In contemporary China, 
tradition is both “socialism” and the more familiar pre-modern “Chinese civilization.”  
This is an odd combination. According to common Chinese understandings of 
intellectual and social history, socialism challenged Confucianism, as modernity 
challenged tradition. Indeed, the standard narrative of the history of political thought 
in China sees these two quotes are contradictory: modern socialist equality vs. 
traditional Confucian hierarchy. Yet now Chinese intellectuals commonly say that in 
order to solve the PRC’s current problems they need to appeal to three traditions: 
Reform, Revolution, and Chinese civilization.8  
This essay will do two things. It will conduct a textual analysis of these two 
quotations, first to locate them in their original context, and then to examine how they 
have been rejuvenated as guides for the twenty-first century. Then it will examine 
how they complement each other as part of a what could be called a “nostalgic 
futurology” that looks back to key events like the Great Leap Forward in order to look 
ahead to Chinese success in the twenty-first century.  
These two “correct formulas” are not the only contradictory formulations in 
contemporary China. It is popular to argue that the PRC is both developed and 
																																																																																																																																																																												
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong Wenji, vol. 7, 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), pp. 88-89. 
7 See W. T. de Bary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 1, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960), p. 176. 
8 See, for example, Qin Yaqing, “Guoji guanxi lilun Zhongguo pai shengcheng de 
keneng he biran” [The Chinese School of International Relations Theory: Possibility 
and Necessity], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi no. 3 (2006), pp. 7-13; Hu Angang, “Mao 
Zedong de qiangguo meng: 60 nian chaobuguo Meiguo ying kaichu quijian” [Mao 
Zedong’s strong nation dream: If you can’t surpass America within 60 years, then 
you should be read off the face of the earth], Renmin wang, October 17, 2013, 
http://blog.people.com.cn/article/2/1382003195623.html.  
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developing, rich and poor, and large and small.9 Rather than understand Deng 
Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” slogan as a contradiction that 
masks a growing nationalism, this essay will examine how these two passages 
likewise are linked in a creative tension where each defines the other. Here the 
conceptual strategy shifts from dialectical materialism’s understanding of a 
contradiction as a problem that needs to be resolved, to a new strategy that allows 
Mao’s “Strengthen Party Unity” quote and the Great Harmony passage to work 
together in a composite ideology that integrates equality and hierarchy into a new 
form of statism that is involved in a global competition of social models: the China 
dream versus the American dream. Hence what these two passages have in 
common is not necessarily a positive ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the 
West and the United States. 
  
Quantity: Mao’s Great Leap Forward to Surpass the United States 
 
Both passages are part of the PRC’s current discourse about the rise/rejuvenation of 
China. To understand the differences between the two passages, it is helpful to 
understand them in terms of quantitative and qualitative strategies. Mao’s quote from 
“Strengthen Party Unity” about surpassing the United States is very clearly a 
quantitative strategy. Earlier in the speech, Mao stated that “A country like ours may 
and ought to be described as ‘great’. Our Party is a great Party, our people a great 
people, our revolution a great revolution, and our construction is great, too.” 
“Greatness” (伟大) here is not measured in terms of cultural achievement, economic 
equality or social justice, but in terms of tonnage of steel. “Great” thus is the material 
quantitative measure of “big.” Big-ness is not absolute, but relative, and for Mao, 
relative to the United States: 
  
The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a 
population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are 
favored with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to 
catch up with the United States. What are your 600 million people doing? 
Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why 
can't you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons of 
steel when they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 
million tons? 
  
Beating the United States is not simply a national goal for China, but is seen as the 
PRC’s responsibility to the world. Otherwise, Mao argues that China “should be read 
off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only 
possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, the Chinese nation will 
be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a 
contribution to mankind.” 
This is the first time that Mao spoke of his goal of surpassing the United States. 
“Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions” was delivered at a 
preparatory meeting for the CCP’s Eighth Party Congress that was held in 																																																								
9 See Zheng Bijian, China’s Peaceful Rise, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2005); Zhang Weiwei, Zhongguo zhenhan: Yige ‘wenming xing guojia’ de 
jueqi [China Shock: The rise of a “civilization-state”], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe, 2011).  
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September 1956. At this time, Mao was fighting against Zhou Enlai and others who 
wanted to consolidate the economic and social gains of land reform and the 
nationalization of industry. They criticized Mao’s more radical economic ideas as a 
“rash advance” (冒进) that was “proceeding too rapidly without due consideration of 
actual circumstances and likely consequences.”10 Mao’s 1956 speech thus was an 
early expression of his push for what would later be called the “Great Leap Forward” 
(1958–1961).  
Drawing on Khrushchev’s 1957 prediction that the Soviet Union would surpass the 
United States in fifteen years, “surpass Britain and catch up to America” (超英赶美) 
became Mao’s main slogan for the Great Leap Forward. According to Bo Yibo, “The 
stated goal of the Great Leap Forward movement was to overtake Britain in iron and 
steel production within just two years, overtake the Soviet Union within four years, 
and overtake the United States within ten years.”11 As we can see, Mao became 
more ambitious as the movement developed.12 But as is well-known, this ambition 
eventually led to humanity’s greatest famine, killing more than 30 million people.13	
Why then would this passage, which exemplifies the key ideas of the disastrous 
Great Leap Forward, continue to be popular? Actually, according to the CNKI 
database, Mao’s 1956 “Strengthen Party Unity” speech was not popular in the 
1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. It regained currency in the 2000s as a way of explaining 
China’s dramatic economic expansion, and predictions that the PRC’s GDP would 
soon surpass that of the United States. In 2008, Chinese confidence surged due to 
Beijing’s successful Olympics—which was credited to the China model of 
“authoritarian state + market capitalism”—and the start of the Global Financial Crisis 
in New York soon after. Futurologists no longer just spoke of the “Rise of China,” but 
also of the “Fall of the West.” For many, Mao’s dream of a strong China that could 
beat America was coming true, and even according to his 1956 timetable of “fifty or 
sixty years”—i.e. 2006-2016.14 
Military intellectual Col. Liu Mingfu and developmental economist Hu Angang come 
from very different institutional backgrounds and pursue quite divergent approaches 
to China’s future; but they both appeal to Mao’s “Strengthen Party Unity” quote to 
make similar arguments about China’s unstoppable rise. For Col. Liu, China was in 
an era of strategic opportunity, when it was incumbent to seize the day and become 
the world’s “No. 1 superpower.” To describe why Mao is the top ideologist of “World 
No. 1-ism,” Liu conducts a close textual analysis of the quote from Mao’s 1956 
“Strengthen Party Unity” speech. Mao is heroic for Liu because he dared to craft a 
grand plan to surpass America, stating that beating the United States would be 
China’s great contribution to humanity. Liu is fascinated by the Great Leap Forward, 
seeing the outrageous ambition of this Maoist mass movement as the key to China’s 																																																								
10 Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962, trans. and 
eds. Edward Friedman, Stacy Mosher and Jian Guo, (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2012), p. 90. 
11 Cited in Hu, China in 2020, p. 29.  
12 See Yao Runtian, “Gongheguo shishang: Ganchao kouhao de youlai yu yanbian” 
[The origin and development of the ‘catch up and surpass’ slogan in the history of 
the republic], Mao Zedong sixiang yanjiu 26(2) (2009), pp. 5-11. 
13 See Yang, Tombstone. 
14 See Hu Angang, Zhongguo daolu yu Zhongguo mengxiang [China path and the 
China dream], (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2013), p. 191. 
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success in the twenty-first century.15 Liu admits that the Great Leap Forward 
“suffered defeat,” and that “a large population met an irregular death.” But he 
concludes that “the ‘Great Leap Forward’ is the roadmap for surpassing Britain and 
catching up to the United States” in the twenty-first century because it shows that in 
order to create a new path one has destroy old rules.16 Liu thus understands Deng 
Xiaoping’s post-Maoist reform and opening policy as a continuation of Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward plan. China’s current and future success, here, is the upshot of Mao’s 
ambitious aspirations from the Great Leap Forward-era. Col. Liu Mingfu’s ideas and 
arguments are important because his China dream of the PRC as a strong military 
power has been largely adapted by Xi Jinping.17 Indeed, the link between the China 
dream and the PRC’s “strong military dream” was celebrated in a set of postage 
stamps that were issued in September 2013 (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: “China Dream: a wealthy and strong country” postage stamps (2013) 
© William A. Callahan 
 
Hu Angang also quotes the “Strengthen Party Unity” speech at length to argue that 
Mao and the speech are important because they created “the strategic concept of 
catching up to, and then surpassing the United States.”18 He elaborates on the 
Mao’s materialist quantitative way of measuring power and status, quoting Mao to 
explain that because of its large territory, large population and superior socialist 
system, China is the only country in the world that is capable of catching up to and 
																																																								
15 Liu, Zhongguo meng, p. 9-13. 
16 Liu, Zhongguo meng, p. 10-11, 13. 
17 See Xi Jinping guanyu Zhongguo meng; Jeremy Page, “For Xi, a 'China Dream' of 
Military Power,” Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2013; “What does Xi Jinping’s China 
Dream mean?” BBC News, June 6, 2013.  
18 Hu, China in 2020, p. 14; also see Hu, Zhongguo daolu yu Zhongguo mengxiang, 
pp. 191-209. 
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surpassing the United States.19 Like Liu Mingfu, Mao is important for Hu Angang 
because he dared to dream of China as the “World’s No. 1” power.20 
Hu Angang’s understanding of China’s future direction is important because he is a 
very influential citizen intellectual. He leads a research institute, Tsinghua 
University’s China National Conditions Research Center, which writes important 
reports for the Chinese government and consults for the PRC’s Five Year Plans. 
In asides and footnotes, Hu actually acknowledges the problems with Mao’s “leap-
forward” economic policy, and is quite critical of the negative economic impact of the 
Great Leap Forward: “By 1965, GDP was 41 percent less than it would have been 
had the Great Leap Forward not taken place.”21 Former World Bank Chief Economist 
Justin Yifu Lin explains that Mao’s “leap-forward strategy” did not lead to sustainable 
economic growth because its capital-intensive development model defied the 
country’s comparative advantage of abundant cheap labor.22 Since Mao’s political 
campaigns to develop heavy industry—i.e. steel production—actually retarded 
China’s economic growth, Mao’s grand political goal of beating the United States 
could only be achieved by discarding Mao’s economic policies. Hence most 
economists contrast the problematic first three decades of the Maoist planned 
economy and the successful three decades of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening 
policy. 
Hu, on the other hand, follows China’s New Left to rehabilitate the Maoist period, 
arguing that “China’s pre-1978 social and economic development cannot be 
underestimated.”23 He challenges the popular notion of the Cultural Revolution as 
“ten lost years,” explaining that this “ten-year upheaval . . . made reform and opening 
possible. It provided the circumstances necessary for the last thirty years of progress 
towards increased unity, stability and prosperity.”24  
It certainly is odd to imagine China’s future in terms of the audacious aspirations and 
disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But this is 
not simply a historical lesson. Mao’s “great leap strategy” is back in vogue. China’s 
recent “great leap forward mentality” can be seen in the leadership’s demands for 
rapid and glorious achievements such as the PRC’s high-speed train network. This 
rush to greatness, critics argue, has led to a rash of accidents, including a major train 
accident in 2011, as well as to broader social and environmental problems.25 Hu 
Angang, however, is unconvinced, reasoning that Mao’s 1956 “Strengthen Party 
Unity” quotation actually is the origin of the economic reform plans unveiled by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979.26 Hu thus concludes: “It now seems that Mao Zedong’s grand 
																																																								
19 Hu, “Mao Zedong de qiangguo meng.” 
20 Hu, Zhongguo daolu yu Zhongguo mengxiang, pp. 191, 196, 208. 
21 Hu, China in 2020, p. 29. 
22 See Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, The China Miracle: Development 
Strategy and Economic Reform, rev. ed., (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
2003). 
23 Hu, China in 2020, p. 27. 
24 Hu, China in 2020, p. 19. 
25 Yao Liwen and Liu Jianping, “Dayuejin shi fazhan weishenme ‘zhiming’” [Why 
Great Leap Forward-Style Development Is “Deadly”], Nanfang zhoumo, September 
29, 2011. 
26 Hu, China in 2020, p. 32. 
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strategy for China is on the verge of being realized. China overtaking the United 
States in terms of GDP, regardless of how it is calculated, is inevitable.”27  
Like Pan Wei and Hu Angang, Zhang Weiwei is interested in how the China Model 
can be an alternative to what they call the “Western Model.” Zhang argues this point 
in his book China Shock (中国震撼), which was translated into English as The China 
Wave.28 China Shock is important because it sold over 1 million copies in China, was 
assigned reading at communist party study sessions in Shanghai, and was read by 
Xi Jinping in Summer 2012, just before he became China’s leader.29 
While Liu Mingfu focuses on military power, and Hu Angang focuses on economic 
power, Zhang Weiwei focuses on political power. His main goal is to show that 
China’s political system is better than the (Western) democratic system. To do this, 
he cites many Western sources to “prove” that China will soon surpass the United 
States economically, politically and culturally—and even argues that his native 
Shanghai is already better than New York.  
In a section called “To the Top,” Zhang reviews British economist Angus Maddison’s 
predictions of China’s surpassing the United States by 2015, before noting: “This 
reminds many Chinese of a famous observation made by Chairman Mao in 1956.” 
Zhang then reproduces the “Strengthen Party Unity” quotation in full, to conclude, 
“Maddison’s prediction seems to tally well with Mao’s forecast back in 1956.” After 
citing predictions from PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Goldman Sachs that China 
soon will overtake the United States, Zhang concludes the chapter by stating that 
“Like it or not, China has risen, or to say the least China is now being held by many 
as the ‘No. 2’ in the world economy. Taking a longer-term view, China will eventually 
be ‘No. 1’ in the future.”30 Once again, Mao’s 1956 quote is used alongside current 
economic analysis to explain how the PRC is destined to become the world’s top 
power. Once again, the huge differences between Mao’s method of analysis and 
those of Maddison, PriceWaterhouseCoopers or Goldman Sachs are effaced simply 
because they come to similar conclusions. In his latest book, China Surpasses: The 
Glory and Dream of a ‘Civilization-State’ (2014), Zhang combines Mao’s “surpass 
America” trope with Xi Jinping’s “China dream” slogan to argue that China has 
already overtaken “the West and the Western model,” and will soon be at the top of 
the world.31 
The last example comes from a recent essay by Zheng Bijian, who was Hu Jintao’s 
top foreign policy intellectual. He is most well-known for creating the “peaceful rise” 
strategy that guided Beijing’s very successful good neighbor policy in the mid-2000s. 
His elaboration on Deng’s “bide and hide policy,” however, was criticized by Liu 
																																																								
27 Hu, China in 2020, p. 45. 
28 Zhang, Zhongguo zhenhan; Zhang Wei-wei, The China Wave: Rise of a 
Civilizational State, (Hackensack, NJ: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012). 
29 Zhang, The China Wave, ix; Li Cheng in “Intellectuals Divided: The Growing 
Political and Ideological Debate in China” panel transcript, (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, September 14, 2011), p. 21; Interview with Zhang Weiwei in 
Oxford, UK, June 10, 2014. 
30 Zhang, The China Wave, p. 24-25, 26. 
31 Zhang Weiwei, Zhongguo chaoyue: Yige ‘wenming xing guojia’ de guangrong yu 
mengxiang [China surpasses: The glory and dream of a ‘civilization-state’], 
Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2014. 
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Mingfu, the hypernationalists of Unhappy China, and many New Left intellectuals as 
either too weak or as a betrayal of the Han race.32 
Since he is not popular with the New Left, it is noteworthy that Zheng begins his “The 
Three Globalizations and China’s Fate” essay (2013) with a reference to Mao’s 
famous quote:  
 
”As early as in 1956, Chairman Mao Zedong said that if we failed to turn 
China into a great socialist country, then we would not be qualified to be 
citizens on this planet. Today, maybe it is fair to say that if we fail to 
achieve industrialization and modernization and if we can’t realize the 
great renaissance of the Chinese civilization in the first half of the 21st 
century, sooner or later we would be disqualified as citizens of this world. 
Therefore the China dream today finds its logical beginning and historical 
root in their firm belief in the “survival and rejuvenation of the nation” born 
of the two centuries of internal crises and foreign aggression.”33 
Zheng uses this passage to open up an analysis of China’s three turning points in 
the context of the world’s three globalizations: 1840 to mark the Opium War and 
Britain’s rise in the first globalization of the industrial revolution, while the Qing 
dynasty fell; 1949 to mark China’s liberation from the second globalization of 
imperialist financial capitalism; 1978 to mark the peaceful rise of China through 
socialism with Chinese characteristics in the third era of globalization. Rather than 
return to Cold War-thinking, Zheng advises all countries to “enlarge the convergence 
of interests and build communities of interest with all countries and regions, first of all 
with surrounding countries and regions.” It is curious, then, that even a global bridge-
builder like Zheng finds Mao’s “Strengthen Party Unity” quote useful for discussing 
the emergence of China as a superpower in the twenty-first century. 
This diverse group of citizen intellectuals exhibits the “catch-up mentality” typical of 
Mao in the 1950s. They measure China’s success in terms of the accepted 
international standards of modernity: steel production, GDP, Transparency 
International, foreign futurologists, and so on. The catch-up mentality is permeated 
by status anxiety, sees international politics as a competition between great powers, 
and crafts familiar strategies of international development (for the economists) and 
“peace through strength” (for the strategists) to build the PRC’s international stature.  
They are drawn to Mao’s 1956 “Strengthen Party Unity” speech because it frames 
China’s objectives in these materialist quantitative terms: surpass the United States 
in terms of military and economic measures. Certainly it’s not strange for China’s 
citizen intellectuals to think about how the PRC could be a great power, while looking 
to previous predictions of when China would be the world’s No. 1 power. It is odd, 
though, that they all choose a reference to the Great Leap Forward, which was on 
such a different path from the Reform and Opening policy that facilitated China’s 																																																								
32 Song Xiaojun, et al., Zhongguo bu gaoxing: Da shidai, da mubiao, ji women de 
neiyou waihuan [Unhappy China: The great era, grand objective, and our domestic 
troubles and foreign calamities], (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2009).  
33 Zheng Bijian, “Sanlun jingji quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo mingyun” [The Three 
Globalizations and China’s Fate], Huanqiu shibao, November 5, 2013, 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2013-11/4528850.html; Zheng Bijian, “The 
Three Globalizations and China,” Huffington Post, January 27, 2014,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zheng-bijian/globalization-and-
china_b_4668216.html. 
      10 
rejoining the world starting in 1978. In other words, Mao’s quote does not make 
sense for the twenty-first century because it embodies two serious misreadings: 1) 
rather than being an example of causation (i.e. Mao’s Great Leap Forward idea led 
to China’s current economic success), it is actually an example of correlation (Mao’s 
prediction of success in 50-60 years came true in spite of his tragic policies that 
retarded China’s economic growth); and 2) Mao’s notion of national power measured 
in terms of steel production does not make sense in the context of the current global 
political-economy that is characterized by transnational production chains in a 
knowledge-based innovation economy. Indeed, China’s massive production of steel 
is now not seen as a strength, but is taken as a sign of the weakness of an 
overcapacity that has to be subsidized by the state.  
The attraction of Mao’s 1956 quote thus is not economic, but political. Liu Mingfu and 
Hu Angang both stress the ideological and conceptual value of “Strengthen Party 
Unity.” For the New Left, this is part of a campaign to rehabilitate Mao, the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in order to confirm the continued 
relevance of socialism and the CCP in China.34 In many ways, it is an example of 
nostalgia for the imagined equality and order of the Maoist period, which is figured as 
the antidote for China’s current money-worship society.35 Mao’s “Strengthen Party 
Unity” speech continues to strike a chord because it was memorized by a whole 
generation of Chinese who grew up in the Cultural Revolution; its currency also 
benefited from the  rise of Maoist websites like Utopia in the mid- to late-2000s, 
which further publicized such radical thought.36 Hu Angang’s fascination with steel 
production is also nostalgic in a more personal way; his given name, “Angang” (鞍钢
), is short for the Anshan Iron and Steel Factory, where Hu’s parents were “national 
model workers.” Although establishment intellectuals like Zheng advise us to get rid 
of our “Cold War mentality,” Mao’s “Strengthen Party Unity” quotation clearly limits 
our imagination to a Cold War-style bipolar contest between China and the United 
States.  
 
Qualitative: Great Harmony and a New Kind of Superpower 
 
International relations theorist G. John Ikenberry recently declared that China simply 
“does not have the ideas, capacities, or incentives to tear down the existing 
international order and build a new one.”37 But as the above analysis suggests, 
China’s quantitative dream to surpass the United States has its qualitative aspects. 
Mao Zedong sees surpassing the world’s “most advanced capitalist country” as the 
moral obligation of China as a “superior socialist country.” This task is framed as an 
all or nothing quest: either China beats America to become the number one country 
in the world, or it gets “read off the face of the earth.” 																																																								
34 See Anthony Garnaut, “The Mass Line on a Massive Famine,” The China Story 
(October 8, 2014), http://www.thechinastory.org/2014/10/the-mass-line-on-a-
massive-famine/ (accessed November 23, 2014). 
35 See Kevin Carrico, “The Imaginary Institution of China: Dialectics of Fantasy and 
Failure in Nationalist Identification, as Seen through China’s Han Clothing 
Movement,” PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 2013. 
36 Zhang, Interview; email correspondence with Gloria Davies, June 14, 2014. 
37 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China, the United States, and the Future of the 
Liberal International Order,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, edited 
by David Shambaugh, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p. 55. 
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In the twenty-first century, Col. Liu Mingfu shares Mao’s zero-sum “worrying 
mentality” to argue that if Beijing misses its current great opportunity for grand 
success then it risks total failure: “If China in the twenty-first century cannot become 
world No. 1, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will become a straggler 
that is cast aside.”38 As we saw above, Zheng Bijian came to a similar conclusion for 
China’s current dream: “if we can't realize the great renaissance of the Chinese 
civilization in the first half of the 21st century, sooner or later we would be 
disqualified as citizens of this world.”  
Everyone here assumes that China’s quantitatively surpassing the United States will 
directly lead to qualitative change: China will provide a new, different, unique and 
superior normative world order. Hu Angang’s quantitative appeal to Mao’s 
“Strengthen Party Unity” speech is part of a larger qualitative argument about how 
China can be a different type of superpower: “a mature, responsible, and attractive 
superpower” that would never “seek hegemony and world domination.”39  
Actually the link between quantitative and qualitative strategies is not as clear as 
China’s citizen intellectuals assume. In fact, China surpassed the United States in 
steel production in 1995 and became the world leader in 1996—but the world order 
did not change.40 Since 2007, the European Union’s GDP has been larger than 
America’s GDP; while there was hope that this would lead to a new postmodern 
normative world order, the EU has yet to emerge as a different kind of world 
leader.41 The previous political-economic transition was also multilayered: the United 
States became the world’s largest economy when it passed Britain in 1872—but it 
did not become a global power until seventy years later with the advent of World War 
II.  
Nevertheless, many citizen intellectuals feel that the PRC will have to assume global 
political leadership soon after it becomes the largest economy in the world. They see 
global leadership as a “crown” that is passed from one world capital to another: from 
London to Washington in the 1940s, and now from Washington to Beijing in the 
2010s. While the quantitative arguments generally appeal to shared international 
standards of measurement—steel production, GDP growth, Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), Human Development Index—it is also common for citizen intellectuals to 
argue that China needs to create its own norms and standards. Firstly, they note that 
Western predictions of China's growth have characteristically been wrong;42 
(unfortunately, they don’t likewise acknowledge that Chinese economic predictions 
haven’t fared much better). Even so, the conclusion of these patriotic worriers is that 
China needs to discover its own “correct formula”: its own system of measures, 
methods and norms that will better reflect its own experience, because the unique 
																																																								
38 Liu, Zhongguo meng, p. 9. Also see Hu and Yan, Zhongguo, p. 1. 
39 Hu, China in 2020, pp. 12, 15. 
40 Rachel Tang, China’s Steel Industry and Its Impact on the United States: Issues 
for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 21, 
2010. Hu Angang has different figures, but comes to the same conclusion (Hu, 
Zhongguo daolu yu Zhongguo mengxiang, 196). 
41 See Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is 
Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, (London: Tarcher, 2004). 
42 See Hu, China 2020, p. 5; Zhang Weiwei, Zhongguo zhenhan; Zhang Weiwei, The 
China Wave, p. 1; Jin Canrong, Zhongguo de weilai [China’s future], (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2011). 
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China Model can only be evaluated by uniquely Chinese criteria.43 This is part of the 
critique of “universal values” found in most New Left literature. According to 
philosopher Zhao Tingyang, to be a true world power the PRC needs to excel not 
just in economic production, but also in “knowledge production.” It needs to stop 
importing ideas from the West, and exploit China’s own indigenous “resources of 
traditional thought” to “create new world concepts and new world structures.”44 Only 
then can China gain the “discursive power” of the “China voice” and “China 
perspective” that are necessary for a new type of superpower.45  
Since the early 2000s, “harmony” has been promoted as China’s alternative to the 
ideas of freedom and democracy. Hu Jintao’s twin slogans were Harmonious Society 
for domestic politics and Harmonious World for international politics. For many then, 
harmony is taken as the quintessentially Chinese ideal. However, on closer 
examination, what we now call “harmony” in Chinese and English can have two quite 
different meanings: he er butong (和而不同) means harmony-with-diversity, while 
Datong (大同) is Great Harmony.  
Great Harmony describes an overarching unity: the “tong” in Datong also means 
sameness. This sameness is seen as harmonious because it describes a united 
universal utopia. As we saw in the introduction, the main source of the ideal of Great 
Harmony is a famous passage from the Book of Rites; it remains one of Chinese 
thought’s key ideals, and still informs plans to create a “perfect world.”46  
While Great Harmony creates perfection through a unified organic order, “harmony-
with-diversity” questions the utility of sameness, and finds value in contingent 
relations. In the famous passage which gives us the phrase “harmony-with-diversity,” 
the Confucian Analects discusses the harmony/sameness (和/同) distinction that is 
found throughout classical Chinese literature: “The exemplary person harmonizes 
with others, but does not necessarily agree with them (i.e. harmony-with-diversity); 
the small person agrees with others, but is not harmonious with them.”47 Here The 
Analects tells us that agreeing with people means that you are the same as them, in 
the sense of being uncritically the same: sameness-without-harmony. Harmony-with-
diversity, on the other hand, allows us to encourage different opinions, norms and 
models in a civil society.  
Rather than describing the same value that is instinctively known by all Chinese, 
Great Harmony and harmony-with-difference present very different models of social 
order and world order: one appeals to the benefits of overarching unity, while the 
other seeks to encourage opportunities for diversity.  
This is not simply a philosophy lesson: these two concepts of harmony continue to 
be invoked by political leaders and citizen intellectuals in China as a way of 
describing Chinese visions of future social order and world order. This is not a totally 
new trend: Kang Youwei’s the Book of Great Harmony (大同书) from the turn of the 																																																								
43 Hu, China in 2020, pp. 25, 30. 
44 Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The under-heaven 
system: The philosophy for the world institution], (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin 
chubanshe, 2011), p. 1. 
45 Hu, 2030 China, p. 215. 
46 See Shiping Hua, Chinese Utopianism: A Comparative Study of Reformist 
Thought with Japan and Russia (1898-1997), (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2009). 
47 The Analects, 13/23. 
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twentieth century revived this ancient concept as a way of solving the problems of 
modern society.48 The Book of Great Harmony gives a detailed plan whereby all 
boundaries between nations, classes, races, genders, families and species are 
“abolished,” thus creating the “Era of Great Peace and Equality.” In 1926, Guo 
Moruo continued this trend in a short story where Marx and Confucius discuss their 
shared utopian goal of Great Harmony.49 In June 1949, Mao Zedong also saw Great 
Harmony as the goal when he wrote, “When Kang Youwei wrote The Book of Great 
Harmony, he had not, and could not, have found a path to that Great Harmony.”50 
During the Great Leap Forward there was much discussion of Great Harmony as a 
model and a goal; indeed, party leaders at a pilot commune project were provided 
with copies of The Communist Manifesto, Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program, and 
Kang Youwei’s Book of Great Harmony.51 In June 1958, Liu Shaoqi explained how 
the Great Leap Forward was using Marxism to fulfill the Great Harmony objective:  
 
“Kang Youwei wanted to break the nine boundaries, that is, the 
boundaries of the nation-state, male versus female, the family, private 
property, and so on. Conditions weren’t ripe for implementation of utopian 
socialist ideas at that time. Now Marxists have seized hold of class 
struggle and have already abolished class or are in the process of doing 
so, and are thereby implementing the utopia that utopian socialists were 
unable to implement.”52 
  
The Great Leap Forward’s violent pursuit of equality and unity was actually in line 
with Kang Youwei’s One World plan. As Kang wrote with excitement and 
anticipation, “by the time we have our World of Great Harmony, the people of all the 
earth will be of the same color, the same appearance, the same size, and the same 
intelligence.” However, achieving this goal of unity and equality would be disastrous 
for difference: to achieve racial equality, for example, Kang provides a detailed plan 
of how the white and yellow races can “annihilate” the black and brown races 
through a social Darwinist process of “smelting and amalgamating.” Large states will 
likewise “annihilate” small and weak states in the pursuit of global unity.53 Much like 
in the Great Leap Forward, Kang’s World of Great Harmony pursues “sameness-
without-harmony” at the expense of “harmony-with-diversity.” 
After the Great Leap Forward, Chinese civilization became a key target during the 
Cultural Revolution that sought to destroy the Four Olds, and then again during the 
early Reform period where it was seen as “feudal superstition” that needed to be 
modernized in Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations campaign. Chinese culture 																																																								
48 Kang Youwei, Datongshu [The Book of Great Harmony], (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 2005). 
49 Guo Moruo, “Makese jin wenmiao” [Marx enters the Confucian temple], In Guo 
Moruo zuopin jingdian, vol. 3 [Guo Moruo’s classic works, vol. 3], (Beijing: Zhongguo 
huaqiao chubanshe, 1997), pp. 394–402. 
50 Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (June 30, 1949), 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. IV, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961). 
51 Yang, Tombstone, pp. 170-71, 249. 
52 Liu Shaoqi cited in Yang, Tombstone, p. 262. 
53 Kang Youwei, Ta T’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei, 
Laurence G. Thompson, trans., (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 148, 
141, 89. 
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became important again with Jiang Zemin’s focus on patriotic education and spiritual 
civilization in the 1990s. Chinese tradition was seen as useful in the CCP’s transition 
from being a revolutionary party that demanded radical change, to being a ruling 
party that advocates stability maintenance; Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” 
specifically argued that the CCP had to represent “China’s advanced culture,” and 
not just socialist culture.54 
Discussion of Great Harmony thus reemerged at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
but in a curious place: the alternative academic space of communist party schools, 
policy institutes and military research institutes that run parallel to elite universities.55 
Rather than arguing that Confucianism had replaced communism, these articles 
generally looked at how Great Harmony could—or could not—work with Marxism in 
China. Those who argued that Great Harmony could help Marxism looked to the 
links between Confucian thought and radicals such as Taiping Rebellion leader Hong 
Xiuquan, Kang Youwei, Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong. This made Great Harmony 
patriotic, while at the same time confirming the nationalist authenticity and legitimacy 
of the CCP. 
Those who questioned the utility of Great Harmony contrasted the timeless ideal of 
its utopian socialism with scientific socialism’s logic of class struggle. According to 
historical materialism, China was in the period of industrialization, therefore Great 
Harmony was criticized as a utopian socialism that grew out of the agricultural 
society of sage kings and Confucius. Critics also noted that the Great Harmony-
inspired Taiping Rebellion and Great Leap Forward both led to catastrophes for 
China: it pushed Mao to skip historical stages to prematurely rush into communism.56   
The declaration of Hu Jintao’s Harmonious Society and Harmonious World slogans 
in 2004-05 signaled victory for those who valued Great Harmony. Harmonious 
society promoted a very detailed set of policies that looked to the party-state to solve 
China’s economic and social problems. Therefore, Harmonious Society’s state-
centric intervention into society appeals to a particular blend of socialist modernity 
and Chinese tradition. While English-language descriptions of the policy stress its 
Confucian roots, in Chinese it is called “harmonious socialist society.” This also has 
global implications: Chinese writers commonly proclaim “harmonious society is the 
model for the world.”57  
According to China’s official Xinhua news agency, harmony-with-diversity was the 
Chinese idiom that Premier Wen Jiabao “most frequently used” on his visit to the 
United States in 2003.58 Although Wen repeated the phrase during his visits to 																																																								
54 Jiang Zemin, On the “Three Represents,” (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 
2002). 
55 For a detailed analysis of harmony discourse in the early 2000s see: 
William A. Callahan, “Remembering the Future: Utopia, Empire and Harmony 
in 21st century International Theory,” European Journal of International 
Relations, 10(4), (2004), pp. 569-601; for a comparative analysis of utopia 
(including Great Harmony) in China, Russia and Japan see Hua, Chinese 
Utopianism.  
56 Chen Jianhua and Zhuang Xiaolong, “Shilun datong sexiang de lishi yiyun ji qi 
juxianxing” [The meaning and limitations of Great Harmony thought], Qiushi no. 1 
(2000), p. 48. 
57 Qin Xiaoying, “Harmonious Society to Be Model for the World,” China Daily, 
October 13, 2006. 
58 Xinhua, December 11, 2003. 
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America and the Arab League in 2009, harmony-with-diversity has decreased in 
popularity since the mid-2000s; on the other hand, declarations of Great Harmony as 
China’s long-term goal have become very popular in recent years.  
Great Harmony thus informs a Chinese futurology that looks to the past for ideals to 
shape a utopian future. Curiously, the endgame for most of China’s chief economic, 
social and political forecasters is the World of Great Harmony (大同世界, 世界大同, 
天下大同). Unfortunately, such descriptions of Great Harmony are characteristically 
vague. When Justin Yifu Lin was World Bank Chief Economist (2008-2012), he had 
a calligraphic scroll of the Great Harmony passage on his wall in Washington D.C. 
Lin explained that its ideals guided his plans for the global economy because “it 
advocates a world in which everyone trusts each other, cares for others and not only 
for himself. . . . This was my vision for the World Bank. . . . We try to work on poverty 
reduction and promote sustainable growth.”59 
In The China Model, Pan Wei argues that the patriarchal values of village life, which 
is presented as a conflict-free organic society, is the source of the PRC’s economic 
success. He sees the PRC as village society writ-large, where the party loves the 
people like a caring father, and the masses are loyal, grateful and respectful, like 
well-behaved children. There is no room in this national village for open debate in 
“civil society,” which Pan condemns as a battleground of special interests that can 
only divide the organic whole. For him, diversity is “division,” and thus a problem that 
needs to be solved by the state. Unity here is the guiding value because Pan—like 
Kang Youwei—sees social order as a process of integrating divisions into the 
organic whole, ultimately into the World of Great Harmony.60 
Like with the China Model, China Dream discourse focuses primarily on domestic 
issues. But there is a growing discussion of its global implications. For example, 
Chapter 7 of Xi Jinping’s official “China Dream” book is devoted to explaining the 
meaning of this slogan to the world. The PRC’s chief foreign propaganda 
organization, the State Council Information Office, held a “China Dream: Dialogue 
with the World” international conference in December 2013.61 Chinese foreign 
minister Wang Yi likewise described the “China Dream” as Xi Jinping’s key 
conceptual innovation in foreign affairs, which led to a successful year for Chinese 
diplomacy in 2013.62  
Many commentators discuss China’s global rejuvenation in terms of the “World 
Dream” (世界梦). As Ma Zhengang, former ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
declared, “China’s Dream is the world’s dream.”63 Xi Jinping explained that the China 																																																								
59 Cited in Annie Maccoby Berglof, “Economic Confucian,” Financial Times, 
November 18, 2011. 
60 Pan, “Dangdai Zhonghua tizhi,” pp. 18, 29. 
61 Xi Jinping guanyu Zhongguo meng, pp. 63-74; “Zhongguo meng zhengzai fahui 
juda ganzhaoli: ‘Zhongguo meng de shijie duihua’ guoji yantaohui fayan gaobian” 
[The China Dream exerts enormous appeal], Renmin ribao, December 12, 2013. 
62 Wang Yi, “Biange shijie, mengxiang Zhongguo: 2013 nian xin yijie dang 
zhongyang waijiao chenggong kaiju” [The changing world dreams of China: The new 
CCP Central Committee’s successful start to foreign affairs in 2013,” Qiushi no. 1 
(January 2014). 
63 Ma Zhengang, “Zhongguo meng gei shijie lai jiyu” [The China dream will bring 
opportunities to the world], Guangming ribao, June 26, 2013; Ren Zhongping, “Zhu 
jiu minzu fuxing de “Zhongguo meng’” [Building the ‘China Dream’ of national 
rejuvenation], Renmin ribao, April 1, 2013, p. 1; Tian Wenlin, “‘Zhongguo meng’ ye 
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Dream “not only enriches the Chinese people, but also benefits the people of the 
world.”64 He also told various foreign audiences that the China’s world dream is not 
for “hegemony;” rather “the China Dream is the dream of peace, development, 
cooperation and win-win relations.”65  
In a People’s Daily essay, “A Century of the ‘China Dream’ and the ‘Great Harmony” 
tradition,” Hua Shiping argues that the World Dream and the China Dream include 
Great Harmony.66 Public intellectuals are developing this idea to propose a post-
American version of the China Dream/World Dream, which has China lead the rise of 
the Global South against the West.67 Hu Angang actually started discussing this 
before Xi Jinping came to power. 2030 China tells us that the “China Dream” is a 
dream of shared wealth in the PRC and of Great Harmony for the World.68 In this 
way, by 2030 China will “have the capability to lead great changes in the world:”69 It 
will “leap forward” to overtake the United States in a “great reversal” of power in 
which “American hegemony” will be replaced by a World of Great Harmony 
controlled by the Global South.70  
While descriptions of Great Harmony are characteristically vague, Hu provides a 
detailed discussion of the concept and the goal. This includes the long quotation 
cited above from the Book of Rites, and his conclusion that “Great Harmony Under 
Heaven” was Confucius China Dream.71 Hu then describes how Kang Youwei 
revived the idea because Kang “felt that developed capitalism was not the end goal 
of humanity, but was just for the ‘Era of Rising Peace’. After this era there is a higher 
level of social development called the people’s Great Harmony of the ‘Era of Great 
Peace and Equality’.” Hu next looks to Sun Yatsen’s “Three Peoples’ Principles” to 
argue that Sun felt that “the true ‘Three Peoples’ Principles’ are the World of Great 
Harmony desired by Confucius” where “the world is shared by all (天下为公).” Lastly, 
he quotes the Mao 1949 passage, cited above, that laments how Kang Youwei could 
not find the correct path to Great Harmony.72 
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In the final chapter of 2030 China, Hu once again appeals to Kang Youwei’s 
emphasis on abolishing borders to summarize Great Harmony’s relevance in the 
twenty-first century:  
 
“What is the World of Great Harmony? It is important to abolish the 
three major borders and narrow the three major gaps: the gaps 
between people, the borders and gaps between countries, and the 
borders and gaps between people and nature. We must get rid of the 
three major ‘centrisms’ and stress the three major ‘shareds’: among 
people, get rid of ‘elitism’ and ‘wealthy-person-ism’, and stress ‘people-
centered-ism’ for common wealth; among nations, we must get rid of 
‘North-centrism’ and ‘power-centrism’, and stress fairness, equality and 
shared prosperity; among people and nature, we must get rid of 
‘people-conquer-nature’ and ‘development-above-all’, to stress that 
nature and humanity are one (天人合一), with shared life and shared 
respect.”73  
 
Hu concludes that “China’s Great Harmony requires the world’s Great Harmony, and 
the world’s Great Harmony also requires China’s Great Harmony.” Thus “the ‘World 
of Great Harmony’ is not only ‘China’s dream’, but is also the ‘world’s dream’.”74 
Hu Angang’s dream thus follows the principles of Great Harmony rather than of 
harmony-with-difference. Like Kang Youwei, Hu sees world unity as the main goal, 
and recommends the “merging of civilizations.”75 Like with his discussion of Mao’s 
1956 “Strengthen Party Unity” speech that pits China against the United States, here 
the South will surpass the North in a new hierarchy guided by China’s Great 
Harmony ideals. 
Since the China Dream became official in 2012, Hu Angang has refined his 
arguments in essays for the People’s Daily, as well as in a new book, The China 
Path and the China Dream.76 In December 2013, he wrote “‘The China Dream’ of 
the World of Great Harmony” for the “China Dream: Dialogue with the World” 
international conference.77 He repeats his calls for a “great reversal” of world order: 
“In the next two decades, the world is going to see the collective rise of the Global 
South, and the end of the North’s domination over the world for the past two 
centuries.” Alongside his appeal to a future of socialist internationalism, Hu defines 
the China Dream and the World Dream of the twenty-first century in terms of 
China’s traditional utopian ideals: Great Peace for All-under-Heaven (太平天下), the 
World Held in Common (天下为公), and the World of Great Harmony (世界大同). 
Hu’s aim then is to “blend both traditional and modern elements” to realize the 
twenty-first century China Dream of the World of Great Harmony, which “is not only 																																																								
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77Hu Angang, “Shijie datong de ‘Zhongguo meng’” [“The China Dream” of the World 
of Great Harmony], Zhongguo wang, December 11, 2013, 
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      18 
the dream of Chinese people, but also that of people in other countries in the 
world.” Here Hu Angang again joins modern socialism, Chinese civilization and the 
PRC’s policy goals. 
 Like Hu Jintao’s signature policies of building a Harmonious Society in 
domestic space and a Harmonious World in international space, Xi Jinping’s China 
Dream/World Dream slogans involve an interpenetration of domestic and global 
politics.78 The argument is that what is good for China is by definition good for the 
world, and vice versa. Indeed, the official slogan “One World, One Dream” of the 
2008 Beijing summer Olympics—which is better translated as “United World, United 
Dream” (同一个世界，同一个梦想)—appealed to the ideal of Great Harmony. This 
was the gist of Xi Jinping’s call for the ‘Asia-Pacific Dream’ at the APEC meeting in 
Beijing in November 2014. 
 Some proponents of the China Dream/World Dream argue that China’s World 
Dream does not include plans to restore China’s “Golden Age” (盛世) of imperial 
world order.79 Yet, as the other articles in this special issue attest, Chinese-style 
international relations theory characteristically endorses the revival of concepts from 
China’s imperial culture, including ideals of a hierarchical world order. Philosopher 
Zhao Tingyang concludes that China’s All-under-Heaven system is the “acceptable 
empire” for the twenty-first century because its benevolent system of governance is 
“reasonable and commendable.”80 Chinese-style IR theory that looks to the 
Sinocentric world order is very popular among officials and public intellectuals.81  
While Mao’s 1956 speech enjoined Chinese to work hard to surpass America, the 
World of Great Harmony likewise rallies the South to surpass the North in a new 
geo-economic and geopolitical struggle. While China should be “bigger” than 
America in the quantitative narrative, the qualitative narrative of China’s World of 
Great Harmony demands that it be “better” than Pax Americana. The Great Harmony 
passage is attractive to a broad group of citizen intellectuals firstly because it is 
provides a properly “Chinese” normative alternative to the rules of the American-led 
liberal international order. The Great Harmony alternative, as we have seen, is 
attractive not in spite of being vague, but just because its vagueness allows for a 
host of different utopian dreams of a prosperous, orderly and equal world society. 
Indeed, the more details are added—as seen in versions promoted by Kang Youwei, 
the Great Leap Forward, and Hu Angang—the more Great Harmony becomes 
“sameness-without-harmony” rather than “harmony-with-difference.” 
It is easy to dismiss such utopian dreams. But they are important because, like with 
Mao’s “Strengthen Party Unity” quote, discussions of Great Harmony as a utopian 
goal shape the way problems—and thus solutions—are formulated in terms of the 
“correct formula.” Like Mao’s 1956 speech, the Great Harmony passage nostalgically 																																																								
78 See Zhang Guangzhao and Chen Zhenkai, “Xi Jinping: Neizheng waijiao xin silu 
[Xi Jinping’s new domestic and foreign policy ideas], Renmin ribao, April 5, 2013; 
Rosemary Foot, ed., China Across the Divide: The Domestic and Global in Politics 
and Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
79 Wang Yiwei, “Waijie dui ‘Zhongguo meng’ shi da wujie” [Foreigners’ Ten 
misconceptions about the ‘China Dream”], Huanqiu shibao, April 16, 2013. 
80 Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ 
(Tian-xia),” Social Identities, 12(1), (2006), pp. 29, 38.  
81 See Hua, “Bainian ‘Zhongguo meng’ yu ‘datong’ chuantong”; William A. Callahan 
and Elena Barabantseva, eds., China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and 
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points to a harmonious experience in China’s imagined past. In both cases, for 
patriotic worriers, “the problem” is a world in which China is not at the center. In both 
cases, the solution is centralizing the world around China, its hard military-economic 
power and its normative goals. Interestingly, the place where the two passages 
overlap most explicitly is as aspirational sources of the Great Leap Forward, the 
disastrous political campaign that the New Left continues to promote as a nostalgic 
futurology. Moreover, rather than engage in political critique, patriotic worriers’ 
search for the single correct formula to “save China” tends to reproduce the grand 
narratives of the state and civilization.82 
 
Conclusion 
 
It’s not strange that China’s citizen intellectuals and establishment intellectuals are 
thinking about how to be a great power, and looking to previous predictions of when 
China could and would become the world’s No. 1 power. It is also not strange that 
these texts look to both quantitative and qualitative measures. As American 
exceptionalism shows, part of the pleasure of being a great power is celebrating the 
moral value of your new world order.  
What is remarkable, however, is what “correct formulas” China’s patriotic 
worriers invoke to guide their national and global aspirations. Mao Zedong’s 1956 
speech “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions,” and the “Great 
Harmony” passage from the two millennia-old Book of Rites make an odd pair; it is 
even stranger when they are invoked as part of Chinese futurology. What they have 
in common is an appeal to the necessity of a strong state to solve both China’s 
problems and the world’s problems. Here socialism no longer looks to class struggle, 
egalitarianism or social justice: it is reduced to the Leninist party-state. Likewise, the 
value of Great Harmony for the twenty-first century is not a caring-sharing society, 
but the appeal to unity over difference, and the collective over the individual. For 
legitimacy in the twenty-first century, Chinese ideology thus appeals to two 
complementary statist traditions: socialism and Chinese civilization. Indeed, even 
Mao saw socialism as a “tradition:” the full title of his 1956 speech is “Strengthen 
Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions.” The contradiction of equality and 
hierarchy thus is effaced in the China Dream, even more so as it goes global as the 
World (of Great Harmony) Dream, which, of course, is led by the PRC. Or to put it 
another way, what these two passages have in common is not necessarily a positive 
ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the West and the United States. 
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